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Reinsurance Pools and the Federal Securities Laws
MICHAEL L. WEISSMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Reinsurance involves the transfer of a risk by agreement from one
company, the "reassured," to another, the "reinsured." Although
the reinsurance agreement may be structured in a number of differ-
ent ways, the motive underlying the execution of the agreement is
always the same. The original insurer, the so-called direct-writing
company, finds itself with more liability to policyholders than it
wishes to carry. It may seek to lessen its liability by persuading
some other company to assume part of the burden in the event of a
loss.' The business relationship is a reinsurance agreement.2
Reinsurance operations are not limited to this kind of transac-
tion-they can be far more intricate. A reinsurer, like a direct-
writing company, may want to expand the volume of its business,
but fears it will be over-exposed if it does. Consequently, one of the
things it may do is reinsure some of the reinsurance it has written.
One of the vehicles used to effectuate this reinsurance is a reinsur-
ance pool.
Reinsurance pools generally consist of groups of companies solic-
ited by a professional reinsurance company to participate in the
"book of reinsurance" which the reinsurer assembles and manages.
The professional reinsurer, which acts as manageK of the pool, ob-
tains contractual commitments of indemnification from the pool
participants; these commitments are needed to support the reinsur-
ance it has assumed. In return, the pool manager grants each partic-
ipant a proportional interest in the profits of the pool. The profits
are measured by the excess, if any, of premiums received over loss
settlements, less the pool manager's fee.
Until recently, little consideration was given to the question
* Partner with the firm of Aaron, Aaron, Schimberg & Hess in Chicago, Illinois. B.S.,
Northwestern University, 1954; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1956; LL.B., Harvard
University, 1958. Mr. Weissman is participating in the case of American Mutual Reinsurance
Co. v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. as counsel for Calvert.
1. K. THOMPSON, REINSURANCE 6 (4th ed. 1966).
2. The domestic property and casualty reinsurance industry is large and growing rapidly.
In 1958 total net reinsurance premium volume was estimated to be $977,000,000. By 1963 it
had grown to $1,377,000,000 and in 1968 the volume was estimated to be $1,794,000,000.
Estimated premium volume has grown from $3,332,000,000 in 1973 to $4,644,000,000 in 1975.
Between 1960 and 1975, premium volume increased by 334%. See J. Zech, Annual Analysis
of the United States Reinsurance Market, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER (December 10, 1976).
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whether the participatory interests in these reinsurance pools are
more than "just insurance" and possibly identifiable as securities
under the federal securities laws. This article will examine the scope
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act' and its relationship to reinsurance
pools. It will also consider whether participatory interests in the
pools are securities under the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934.1 Special attention will be given to
the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in American Mutual Reinsur-
ance Co. v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,I the first judicial considera-
tion of these matters.7
THE AMERICAN MUTUAL CASE
The plaintiff in American Mutual, American Mutual Reinsurance
Company (Amreco), managed a reinsurance pool of one hundred
insurance companies. Calvert executed an agreement to participate
in the pool. Under the contract, Calvert's participation commenced
on January 1, 1974, and could be terminated by either party on
December 31st by one party giving the other six months prior writ-
ten notice.'
On April 22, 1974, Calvert requested retroactive termination,
which Amreco refused. Amreco brought suit to compel Calvert to
share the losses and premiums attributable to that period. Calvert
counterclaimed, alleging that Amreco's offer and sale of the partici-
patory interest constituted a security; it alleged that Amreco did not
comply with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933, and that Amreco violated rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 by making omissions and misrepresentations
of material facts. Amreco argued that its contract with Calvert did
not constitute a security, and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act pre-
cluded application of federal securities law to the reinsurance con-
tract.'
The trial court found that the agreement did not constitute a
security and struck those portions of Calvert's answer and counter-
claim containing those allegations.' 0 Following an interlocutory ap-
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq. (1970).
4. Id. §§ 77b et seq.
5. Id. §§ 77c et seq.
6. 52 I1. App. 3d 922, 367 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1977).
7. Quite apart from whether the Illinois Appellate Court reached the proper result is the
question of whether the decision was rendered in the-proper forum. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co.
v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977).
8. 52 I1. App. 3d at 923, 367 N.E.2d at 106.
9. Id. at 924, 367 N.E.2d at 106-07.
10. Id. at 923, 367 N.E.2d at 106.
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.peal, the First District affirmed the trial court."
The court first determined that the reinsurance pool constituted
the "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
thus was exempt from federal securities laws.'" Moreover, it said
that the Illinois Insurance Code provided a scheme of state regula-
tion of insurance which rendered the federal securities laws unneces-
sary.' 3 Finally, the court held that even without the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934 are none-
theless inapplicable because insurance contracts are not
"securities" within the meaning of those acts.'4
To fully understand the implications of these holdings, it is neces-
sary to consider the relevant federal laws and their judicial interpre-
tation.
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Through 1944, insurance was not considered to be commerce and,
therefore, not subject to the regulatory power of the federal govern-
ment, even when conducted on an interstate basis.'" Until that time
state regulation of insurance was exclusive. The United States Su-
preme Court's opinion in United States v. South-Eastern Underwri-
ters Association'6 radically changed this situation.
The South-Eastern Underwriters case arose from an indictment
charging 128 corporations and twenty-seven individuals with a con-
spiracy to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive rates on
fire insurance which they sold in violation of the Sherman Act. The
defendants challenged the sufficiency of the indictment, alleging
the federal district court lacked jurisdiction because fire insurance
was not commerce. The district court dismissed the indictment.
However, the Supreme Court held that interstate insurance transac-
tions did constitute commerce, and, thus, were subject to regulation
by Congress.'7 Congress responded to this decision by passing the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 (McCarran Act or Act). The Act
was intended to give support to state systems which regulated and
taxed "the business of insurance.' 8
11. Id. at 929, 367 N.E.2d at 111.
12. Id. at 927, 367 N.E.2d at 109.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 927-28, 367 N.E.2d at 109-10.
15. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
16. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
17. Id. at 551-53.
18. For a discussion of the scope of the statutory language see Note, Federal Regulation
of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1340,
1345-55.
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The McCarran Act places the business of insurance beyond the
purview of federal securities laws. In order for the Act to bestow such
immunity, however, the business in question must be: (1) the
"business of insurance" within the meaning of the Act; (2) subject
to state regulation; and (3) it must be demonstrated that applica-
tion of the federal securities laws would invalidate, impair, or su-
persede the state system of regulation.
Legislative History
Two important observations about the McCarran Act are perti-
nent. First, the stimulus for its enactment was the imminent proba-
bility that federal antitrust laws would be applied to an industry in
which prices are usually established through rating bureaus sanc-
tioned under state law. Industry members actively participated in
these rating bureaus. Obviously, this could have produced an anom-
alous result i.e., a company engaged in conduct expressly permitted
under state law thereby might have subjected itself to prosecution
under federal law. Second, when advised that it had the power to
regulate interstate insurance transactions, Congress made it clear
that in passing the McCarran Act, it did not intend to cede to the
states any greater power to regulate or tax the business of insurance
than they had possessed prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters
decision.
In its Committee Report accompanying the McCarran Act, the
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary stated:
It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legisla-
tion to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the
business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to
possess prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Southeastern Underwriters Association case. Briefly, your commit-
tee is of the opinion that we should provide for the continued
regulation and taxation of insurance by the States, subject always,
however, to the limitations set out in the controlling decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, as for instance, in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, . . . St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, ..
and Connecticut General Insurance Co. v. Johnson, . . . which
hold, inter alia, that a State does not have the power to tax con-
tracts of insurance or reinsurance entered into outside its jurisdic-
tion by individuals or corporations resident or domiciled therein
covering risks within the State or to regulate such transactions in
any way."9
19. H.R. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 9
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In view of the foregoing admonition, the decisions mentioned in
the Committee's Report illustrate the extent to which federal regu-
lation of the insurance business was to continue irrespective of the
passage of the McCarran Act. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana'" and St.
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas," state statutes purporting
to regulate or tax interstate insurance transactions were held uncon-
stitutional. More significantly, in Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Johnson,2 the Supreme Court held that California could
not constitutionally tax reinsurance premiums received outside Cal-
ifornia even though the reinsured risks had originally been insured
in California by companies authorized to do business in that state.
Connecticut General demonstrates that there are significant limita-
tions upon the power of any state to regulate interstate insurance
transactions. A state's attempt to regulate interstate reinsurance
transactions would run afoul of Connecticut General. Thus, it is
quite evident Congress did not intend by the McCarran Act to com-
pletely withdraw from regulation of the insurance industry. What-
ever the states could not constitutionally tax or regulate remained
subject to federal control.
The Scope of the Act
Although the McCarran Act enumerates federal statutes which
may be applied to the insurance industry,23 it does not necessarily
follow that all others are excluded. There are numerous instances
where federal laws were held applicable to the activities of insurance
companies despite the McCarran Act.24 For example, in Zachman
L,. Erwin,25 the Securities Act of 1933 was applied to an allegedly
fraudulent sale of securities by an insurance company, notwith-
standing the McCarran Act. Even in state court proceedings, the
Act is not recognized as an absolute bar to the application of federal
law to insurance companies.26 And the exemption from the federal
20. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21. 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
22. 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
23. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970) (agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimi-
date); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970); Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988
(codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
24. Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971)(Federal Arbitration Act); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957)(Lanham Trade-Mark
Act); United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951) (federal mail fraud statute);
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(Fed-
eral Arbitration Act); United States v. Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960)(criminal
violations of the Securities Act of 1933).
25. 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
26. In Langdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), it was held that
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antitrust laws under the McCarran Act is not absolute.27
Moreover, all aspects of the business of an insurance company are
not perforce "the business of insurance." A federal district court
rejected this argument in American Family Life Assurance Co. v.
Planned Marketing Associates.18 The American Family court per-
ceived 1969 as the turning point in McCarran Act interpretation
because in that year the Supreme Court held in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.29 that the "business of insurance" pertained only to
those activities peculiar to the insurance industry.30 The American
Family court noted that such acts include "the relationship between
the insurer and the insured, the language and content of the insur-
ance policy, [and] the financial reliability of an insurance com-
pany . . . . "31 According to National Securities, business activities
of insurance companies which are not peculiar to the insurance
industry remain subject to federal regulatory controls. 3 The district
court again referred to National Securities to delineate the scope of
the term "the business of insurance":
The Supreme Court in National Securities suggested a number of
activities in which State regulation would be paramount. These
include the fixing of rates, the selling and advertising of policies,
the licensing of companies and their agents, the contract of insur-
ance, itself, the type of policy which could be issued, the policy's
reliability, interpretation and enforcement, and "other activities of
insurance companies relate[d] so closely to their status as reliable
insurers."33
The American Family court declined to characterize a raid by one
insurance company upon the business and agents of another as the
"business of insurance" under the National Securities standards.
The court stated that the "activities complained of by plaintiff
pertain to none of the [abovementioned] categories nor to any
other category of activity that bears on the relationship between the
insurance company and the policyholder." The activities com-
the McCarran Act did not abrogate a provision of the Internal Revenue Code concerning the
priority of tax claims in an insolvency proceeding involving an insurance company.
27. See Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295
(N.D. Cal. 1968); United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
28. 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (E.D. Va. 1974).
29. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
30. 389 F. Supp. at 1145.
31. Id.
32. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
33. 389 F. Supp. at 1146-47.
34. Id. at 1147.
[Vol. 9
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plained of could be employed as easily by one stock brokerage firm
against another. The court concluded: "[Tihe activities com-
plained of are not part of the business of insurance. They are merely
a part of business. ''5
In American Mutual, the Illinois Appellate Court heldthe
McCarran Act barred the application of the federal securities laws
to the reinsurance pool because it constituted the "business of insur-
ance" within the meaning of the Act.3" The American Mutual court
failed to perceive that the activities involved, i.e., the procurement
of contractual commitments of indemnification, was not peculiar to
theinsurance industry. Rather, it was a program of capital procure-
ment and capital procurement is something common to all busi-
nesses, not just insurance companies.
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws
In SEC v. Howey Co., 37 the Supreme Court established a defini-
tion of a security which encompasses items that at first glance ap-
pear to be excluded. The Supreme Court has also explicitly recog-
nized that a contractual relationship originating in the insurance
industry may have both an insurance and non-insurance compo-
nent, with the latter classified as a security.38 Justice Brennan, con-
curring in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 3 stated:
Much bewilderment could be engendered by this case if the issue
were whether the contracts in question were "really" insurance or
"really" securities-one or the other. It is rather meaningless to
view the problem as one of pigeonholing these contracts in one
category or the other. 0
Moreover, it often has been stated that all elements of a transac-
tion do not have to be "securities" in order for the entire transaction
to so qualify and be subject to the federal securities laws."
35. Id.
36. 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 927, 367 N.E.2d 104, 109.
37. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
38. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
39. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
40. Id. at 80. In the United Benefit case, a unanimous Court affirmed Justice Brennan's
approach which included the observation that "[f]irst, we do not agree with the Court of
Appeals that the 'Fexible Fund' must be characterized in its entirety. Two entirely distinct
promises are included in the contract .... " 387 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
41. In Jones v. Internat'l Inventors, Inc. East, 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1976), this
aspect of Howey was specifically noted:
Interestingly, in Howey, the touchstone of the "investment contract" therein was
the existence of an optional management agreement, in the sense that the court
found that the feasibility and success of the enterprise, in attracting individuals to
19781
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Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 193342 and section 3(a)(10) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193441 include an "investment
contract" in the definition of a security. An investment contract, in
turn, was defined by the Supreme Court in Howey as a "contract,
transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party . . .,,"
Courts are mindful of the remedial nature of federal securities
laws when applying this definition to particular contracts, transac-
tions, or schemes to determine whether or not they constitute securi-
ties. Accordingly, they adopt "the familiar canon of statutory con-
struction that remedial legislation should be broadly construed to
effectuate its purpose."" In a search for the meaning and scope of
the term "security," substance is considered rather than form, and
the emphasis is on economic reality. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 6 the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and com-
monplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact
that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of
dealing which established their character in commerce as
invest, and in cultivating, harvesting, and marketing the citrus product, rested
upon the availability of the Howey Company's management. Thus, the fact that
what the investors had purchased was nominally an interest in real estate did not
preclude the court from finding that the investors had purchased a "security".' In
a similar vein, the investment of money herein in consideration for a so-called
"service contract" does not ipso facto preclude the applicability of the federal
securities laws.
Id. at 122 n.1 (citation omitted).
See also Safeway Portland Employees' Fed. Credit Union v. Wagner & Co., 501 F.2d 1120
(9th Cir. 1974), where the court commented:
Furthermore, all elements of an investment contract do not have to be securities
in order for the entire package to so qualify. The Tenth Circuit faced a similar
problem wherein one defendant sold beavers, notifying the purchasers that the
other named defendants would independently raise the beavers for a fee. It was
there held that the sale, by itself, did not require registration, but when the sale
was only part of a larger marketing concept wherein the purchaser expected profits,
not from the resale of the beavers, but from the contracts pursuant to which the
beavers were bred, raised and marketed, it was an "investment contract."
Id. at 1123-24 (footnotes omitted). In Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner & Co., 405
F. Supp. 385, 388 (D. Mass. 1975), Safeway Portland was cited with approval and was said
to be entirely consonant with Howey.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq. (1970).
43. Id. §§ 77b et seq.
44. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
45. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
46. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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"investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security."47
Courts have thus found a myriad of diverse financial schemes to
constitute securities despite the fact that, on first examination, they
do not resemble the common and traditional forms of securities.
Examples include promotional memberships in a yet-to-be devel-
oped country club,18 assignments of oil and gas leases with test
drilling,49 live silver foxes with maintenance agreements, 0 whiskey
warehouse receipts," sale of land with a contract to develop citrus
groves,52 investments in trust deeds,33 and contracts for delivery of
oil by a purchaser of oil royalties. 4 The Supreme Court has itself
led the way in expanding the concept of a security by reversing
restrictive lower court decisions five of the six times it has consid-
ered the question."5 In the only case in which the Court declined to
find that securities were involved, the holding was premised on the
fact that shares of stock in a state-subsidized and supervised non-
47. Id. at 351.
48. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
49. Buie v. United States, 420 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1969); Atherton v. United States, 128
F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1942).
50. SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
51. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Haffenden-Rimar Internat'l, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d
746 (9th Cir. 1944); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Associates, 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v.
Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
52. Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953); Ferland v. Orange Groves, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
53. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
54. SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937). Other examples of "securities"
include: founding memberships sold to raise capital to establish a retail store, State v. Hawaii
Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); pyramid schemes and multi-level
distributorships, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); live beavers with mainte-
nance agreement, Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971), Continental Marketing
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967); live chinchillas for breeding, Miller v. Central
Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); discretionary commodities futures trad-
ing accounts, Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.Iowa 1974), Johnson
v. Espey, 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); limited
partnership interests, Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
undeveloped lots in real estate development, McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
1975); gold and silver coins purchased on margin, Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 404 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975); interests in non-contributory pension plans, Daniel v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1977); and offer of contracts for sale of land, SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318
(D. Minn. 1972).
55. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 329 U.S. 344 (1943).
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profit housing cooperative had been purchased "solely to acquire
subsidized low-cost living space; . . .not to invest for profit."5
Guided by the Supreme Court, lower courts have not hesitated to
cut across other non-securities fields to give full content to what the
Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight called the "expansive concept of
security."57 Under the Howey test, four elements must be present to
establish an investment contract; there must be (1) an investment
of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of
profits, (4) solely from the efforts of others. 5 The last two criteria
clearly apply to reinsurance pools, but the first two require elabora-
tion.
Investment of Money
Commentators have agreed that the Howey requirement of an
investment of money does not mandate a cash contribution.59 Even
though the Howey Court spoke in terms of money, there is no
justification for excluding contributions of services or other prop-
erty. Although the investor's commitment in a securities transac-
tion is often expressed in terms of money, actual payment of money
is not required: "There must be money's worth invested, but the
consideration does not have to take the form of cash received. '8 0
Thus the first Howey element can be satisfied by any legally suffi-
56. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
57. 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967). In Tcherepnin, the savings and loan industry was under
consideration. In National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir.
1969), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1971), it was the commercial Bank industry, over whose "commingled managing agency
accounts" the SEC had taken jurisdiction. In SEC v. First American Bank & Trust Co., 481
F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), the court considered it "clear" that the bank's capital notes, certifi-
cates of investment, and passbook savings accounts were "securities." Even the traditional
test for an investment contract articulated in Howey has been relaxed in recent cases by de-
emphasizing the "solely" in Howey's reference to the investor's expectation of profits "solely
from the efforts of a promoter or a third party." See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Mitzner v.
Cardet Internat'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. II. 1973). See also SEC Sec. Act Rel. No.
5211, [19711 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,446.
58. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
59. See, e.g., Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defin-
ing Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L. REv. 219, 236 (1974), where the authors comment:
The investor must supply some consideration; Howey spoke of money, presumably
cash. There seems to be no analytic reason, however, to suggest that Justice Mur-
phy purposely excluded the investor who furnishes property or services. Any dis-
tinction based upon conditions which may accompany the property or services goes
to the nature of the expectation of return, or to the control exercised, not to the
furnishing of valuable consideration.
60. Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 161 (1971).
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cient consideration, as long as it is a source of capital for the ven-
ture. Several cases illustrate this point.
In El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp.,6 the plaintiff borrowed
$40,000 from Nationwide Investment Corporation, and used the pro-
ceeds of the loan to purchase mutual funds which were then pledged
as collateral for the loan. The plaintiff received certain tax benefits
and investment leverage from the transaction. Nationwide had the
power to rehypothecate her collateral up to the amount of her in-
debtedness, and pledged it to secure Nationwide's own business
borrowings. The Ninth Circuit confronted the question whether the
"economic realities" of the plan rather than its formal structure
were such that it was an "investment contract" and, therefore, a
security as defined in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Nationwide argued that the transaction did not meet the first
Howey test because the plaintiff had not provided Nationwide with
capital. It contended that the plaintiff instead received investment
capital in the form of a loan. The court flatly rejected this argument,
declaring that even though the plaintiff received a loan for invest-
ment purposes, she in turn provided Nationwide with capital for its
business operations.2 After discussing the other elements of Howey,
the Ninth Circuit summarized its holdings and rationale as follows:
In conclusion, the Nationwide plan was an investment of risk capi-
tal. Ms. El Khadem risked financial loss in order to gain certain
financial advantages. Nationwide sought the use of Ms. El
Khadem's capital, in the form of credit and collateral, for its own
business purposes. Ms. El Khadem's risk depended on the skill
with which Nationwide conducted its business ventures and man-
aged her collateral and promissory note. It is precisely this type of
risk venture that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were designed to control. Therefore, we hold
that the Nationwide plan was a security as defined by the Acts."3
In Hector v. Wiens,"' the Ninth Circuit confirmed the El Khadem
rationale and again held that an immediate cash investment was
not necessary for a contractual arrangement to involve an invest-
ment contract. Hector dealt with an arrangement wherein a grain
farmer executed promissory notes in order to carry out a business
transaction in which a feedlot was to buy, feed and sell livestock for
the farmer's account. The promissory notes were to be repaid out
61. 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
62. Id. at 1228.
63. Id. at 1229-30.
64. 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976).
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of the proceeds from the sale of the livestock. The farmer contended
that the arrangement involved the sale of an investment contract.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that "an 'investment of money'
means only that the investor must commit his assets to the enter-
prise in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss."'"5
It is commonly accepted, therefore, that an immediate cash out-
lay is not necessary to find that a contractual arrangement involves
an "investment contract." Howey's first prerequisite requires
"[an investment of money, or tender of initial value.'"" In the
reinsurance situation, each pool participant "invests" with the pool
manager in that the members supply the pool with investment capi-
tal in the form of contractual commitments to indemnify the man-
ager. These commitments enable the pool manager to enter into the
various contracts which are expected to produce a profit for the pool.
Moreover, the indemnity agreements subject the assets of the pool
participants to the risk of financial loss. Thus, the first Howey re-
quirement for an investment contract is satisfiedY
65. Id. at 432.
66. In re Bestline Products Securities, 412 F. Supp. 732, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1976)(emphasis
added). Decisions reaching the same conclusion include: SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974)(forebearance from bringing legal action given in exchange
for a note constituted the purchase and sale of a security); United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d
81 (7th Cir. 1942)(trust certificate issued in consideration of the surrender of stock certificates
was a security)("In other words, one may sell a security and be paid therefor in cash, or in
another security, or in any other object of value such as a house, horse, etc." Id. at 83); SEC
v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961)(oral agreements between the defendants and
various persons to the effect that the persons were employed on a non-salary basis in exchange
for participation in the company's profits were investment contracts and the performance of
the services constituted the giving of "value"); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70
(W.D. Ky. 1942) (sales of whiskey warehouse receipts are securities). Moreover, it has been
repeatedly held that soliciting the consents of security holders to substantial alterations in
the terms of their securities constitutes an "offer" and "sale" of a security. See 1 Loss,
SEcuRrrTEs REGULATION 513-14 (2d ed. 1961) and cases cited therein. See also Ingenito v.
Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(substitution of cattle maintenance con-
tracts with reduced monthly charges was sale of a security).
67. There is abundant authority warning against too narrow a reading of the Howey
standards. In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that
a literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the remedial purposes of the
Act. . . The Supreme Court admonished against such a rigid and quixotic applica-
tion, noting . . . that in searching for the meaning and scope of the word security,
form should be disregarded for substance, and proclaiming . . . that "[tihe statu-
tory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by
unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." It would be anomalous to maintain that the
Court in Howey intended to formulate the type of intractable rule which it had
decried. The admitted salutary purpose of the Acts can only be safeguarded by a
functional approach to the Howey test.
In Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 977
(1967), the Seventh Circuit said that the broad definition of the terms "purchase" and "sale"
Reinsurance Pools
A Common Enterprise
The second Howey requirement is investment in a "common en-
terprise," which is satisfied by the reinsurance pool. The pools con-
sist of several insurance companies, each entitled to receive an
agreed percentage of profits or to suffer the same percentage of the
losses. Thus, all participants earn profits or suffer losses from a
common revenue pool. The pool exhibits the kind of commonality
that is essential to a finding that the particular instrument issued
to a group of investors is a security.
This point can best be illustrated by comparing the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities Inc." with the Su-
preme Court's holdings in Tcherepnin v. Knight" and Investment
Company Institute v. Camp.10 In Milnarik, the plaintiffs sought to
rescind their individual discretionary commodity trading accounts
with their broker. Although it was clear that plaintiffs had invested
their funds with the broker expecting that profits would be earned
solely as a result of his efforts, the court concluded that no security
was involved. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no common
enterprise since the success or failure of any one of the individual
trading accounts would have no impact on the success or failure of
any other trading account.
In Tcherepnin, however, the Supreme Court found that a com-
mon enterprise was involved. The Tcherepnin investors could ex-
pect a return on their investment only if the lending institution
showed a profit. The amount of dividends any investor could receive
was tied directly to the amount of profits the institution made from
year to year. Therefore, the crucial distinction from Milnarik is that
in Tcherepnin the investment decisions of the managers affected
each participant.
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,71 the Court consid-
ered a plan under which certain customers of a bank were offered a
collective investment service. Under the plan, the bank's customer
tendered not less than $10,000 nor more than $500,000 and executed
an authorization making the bank the customer's managing agent.
Each customer's investment was added to a common trust fund. A
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 "indicates an intention by Congress that the words
'purchase' and 'sale' are not limited to transactions ordinarily governed by the commercial
law of sales. The purpose is evidently to make control of securities transactions reasonably
complete and effective to accomplish the purposes of the legislation."
68. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
69. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
70. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
71. Id.
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written acknowledgement of participation was issued which ex-
pressed in "units of participation" the customer's proportionate in-
terest in the assets of the common trust fund. The Supreme Court
held that the bank was involved in issuing and selling securities in
violation of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933.2 Obviously, the
pooling of the participants' capital gave the investment fund the
commonality requisite to a finding that securities had been offered
and sold.
Reinsurance pools square with the Tcherepnin and Investment
Company Institute decisions because each participant in the pool
earns profits or suffers losses in common with other participants.
As in Tcherepnin, the investment decisions of the pool manager
affect every pool member. The commonality test of Howey is met.
Expectation of Profits and Efforts of Others
The final two Howey elements are clearly present in reinsurance
pools. First, the investor must expect profits from the common en-
terprise. With reinsurance pools, the participants naturally antici-
pate that the pool manager's skill and expertise will make the pool
a profitable investment. Second, Howey requires that the antici-
pated profits be generated soley from the efforts of persons other
than the investor. Although the recent trend is to modify this rule
to allow some effort by the investor,7 3 reinsurance pools satisfy the
stricter requirement. Participation is solicited on the basis that
members can rely on the expertise of the pool manager.
Thus, a participation in a reinsurance pool is a security under the
Howey test, and is therefore subject to federal securities laws. What-
ever rationale exists against inclusion of these participations in the
federal definition must rest on peripheral grounds. Some of these
will be considered below.
JUDGING A REINSURANCE POOL
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,7 the Supreme Court, in
construing the Securities Act of 1933, stated that, "In the enforce-
ment of an Act such as this it is not inappropriate that promoters'
offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be." 75
This approach to the identification of a security is suggested by the
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (1970).
73. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitzner v.
Cardet Internat'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. I1. 1973).
74. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
75. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
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statute itself. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 refers to "any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.""'7 Thus the
characterization of an interest as a security possibly could be
avoided, depending on its representation by promoters. However,
this test cuts both ways.
Thus, Mitzner v. Cardet International Inc." held that a franchise
agreement was a security under both the Securities Act of 193311 and
the Illinois Securities Act of 1953.11 The court was influenced by the
offeror's characterization of the offered instrument as an invest-
ment, noting the repeated use of the word in the advertising bro-
chure.
Reinsurance agreements are not inapposite. In American Mutual,
for example, the pool manager and sponsor repeatedly and consis-
tently characterized a participation in the pool as an investment
which would prove sound, profitable, and very rewarding. It did not
represent the transaction as merely a reinsurance contract. Never-
theless, the American Mutual court gave no weight to Amreco's
characterization of the participations. 0 Under the Joiner rationale,
the court's consideration of Amreco's label for the instrumentalities
would have been an appropriate factor in deciding whether an in-
vestment contract had been issued to the defendant.
THE "SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR" RATIONALE
An argument can be made that pool participants are
"sophisticated investors" and should be capable of looking out for
themselves. Thus, they would not require the protection of federal
securities laws. But this "sophisticated investor" rationale is with-
out a sound basis in law.
In Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.,"
the Fifth Circuit, after recognizing that the Securities Act of 1933
is remedial legislation entitled to a broad construction with the
result that exemptions must be viewed narrowly, dismissed the
"sophisticated investor" defense as follows:
The defendants rely most strongly on the fact that the offering was
made only to sophisticated businessmen and lawyers and not the
average man in the street. Although this evidence is certainly fa-
vorable to the defendants, the level of sophistication will not carry
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
77. 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b et seq. (1970).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 112, § 137.1 et seq. (1970).
80. 52 I1. App. 3d 922, 930, 367 N.E.2d 104, 111.
81. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the point. In this context, the relationship between the promoters
and the purchasers and the "access to the kind of information
which registration would disclose" become highly relevant factors
... .Obviously if the plaintiffs did not possess the information
requisite for a registration statement, they could not bring their
sophisticated knowledge of business affairs to bear in deciding
whether or not to invest in this franchise sales center.8 2
Hence, even if pool participants are "sophisticated," this would
not eliminate the sponsor's duty to comply with the Securities Act
of 1933 by furnishing participants with information sufficient to
make a fully informed investment decision. The arguments apply
with equal force to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.83
PRESENT INDUSTRY PRACTICE
Currently, managers of reinsurance pools do not comply with the
federal securities laws. Pool managers, however, cannot take refuge
behind the fact that compliance is not customary in the reinsurance
industry. In Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,"4 the defendant
claimed that it did not violate the federal securities laws because it
had simply adhered to the customary practice of the industry. The
court rejected this argument. It held that "even where a defendant
is successful in showing that it has followed a customary course in
the industry, the first litigation of such a practice is a proper occa-
sion for its outlawry if it is in fact in violation. 8 5 Thus, the reinsur-
ance industry cannot evade securities regulation merely by arguing
that it is not the practice in the industry to comply.
OTHER DISTINCTIONS
There are other distinctions capable of placing reinsurance partic-
ipations outside the scope of Howey, but most fall on close analysis.
It could be argued, for example, that unlike the Tcherepnin inves-
82. Id. at 690. See also Haber v. Bordas [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,330 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Sophistication of the offerees involved is not a substitute
for 'access to the kind of information which a registration statement would disclose'."). In
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973), the court commented: "The statute is in-
tended to promote full disclosure to every investor regardless of his particular business back-
ground . . . . [SEC v.1 Ralston Purina [346 U.S. 119 (1953)] rejects the idea that an
exemption exists based only on the individual sophistication of the offeree and without regard
to his actual knowledge concerning the issuer." Id. at 373-74.
83. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), where the Second Circuit held that, in reference to the 1934 Act, even
"speculators and chartists .. . are . . . 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal
protection afforded conservative traders."
84. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 1171.
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tors, a pool participant has no right to receive dividends contingent
upon an apportionment of profits. In addition, the participatory
interest is neither negotiable nor subject to hypothecation.
The first distinction is one of nomenclature rather than sub-
stance. As to the second, there is authority that non-negotiability
does not preclude a finding that the securities acts are inapplicable.
The Ninth Circuit in El Khadem considered a non-negotiable prom-
issory note to be an investment contract.8" Furthermore, the promis-
sory note in El Khadem was not subject to pledge or hypothecation,
since it had already been hypothecated by the issuer of the security.
Nevertheless, the court held the federal security laws were applica-
ble.
Another distinction between generally recognized securities and
pool participations is that pool participations carry no voting rights.
Yet in both Howey and Joiner the Supreme Court considered instru-
ments to be securities despite the absence of voting privileges. 7
Another possible difference is that the contract at issue in the
reinsurance case does not appreciate in value. But many non-
convertible debt instruments, sold to investors primarily for income,
have little likelihood of capital appreciation. Nonetheless, they are
considered to be securities.
ANALOGY TO BANK LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
The legal structure of bank loan participations bears striking re-
semblence to that of reinsurance participations. Therefore, this line
of authority is pertinent to an -understanding of whether the federal
securities law should apply in the reinsurance pool situation.
In American Mutual, it was established that the pool manager
organized the pool each year with participants from the United
States and Canada. Contractual commitments were collected from
the various participants and a participation agreement was signed
by each of them. The special expertise of the pool manager was used
to assemble and manage a book of reinsurance for the common
account of all members of the pool. The managing company re-
tained 41/2% of the premiums collected for its managerial services.
The pool participants relied upon the managing company's widely
promoted skill and expertise in the selection and management of the
book of reinsurance to make the pool successful and their invest-
ments profitable.
86. El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974).
87. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
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Bank loan participations have many similar characteristics. They
have been described as follows:
In a loan participation . . . the lead bank is not a conduit, but is
the promoter of the entire lending scheme. It attracts the capital
needed to support the actual loan, and superintends the lending
arrangement with the borrower. Practical exigencies dictate that
the participants rely heavily on the lead bank's judgment, collat-
eral information, and procedures necessary to protect the credit
involved in the participated loan. The lead is the focal point in the
entire lending structure; consequently, the participants invest in
the judgment and skill of the lead bank in making the enterprise
a success.
8 s
Thus, in a bank loan participation, only the lead bank is named
as the secured party in the loan agreement and as the payee in the
notes evidencing the borrower's obligation.89 In the reinsurance pool
arrangement, only the pool manager is a party to the various rein-
surance agreements made with the companies whose policies are
reinsured by the pool. The rights of a bank participating in a loan
are formalized in a document called a participation certificate.'" In
the reinsurance pool, the pool participant's rights are evidenced by
a document called a participating agreement. A bank acquiring an
interest in a participation loan receives an undivided share of the
loan as well as an undivided share in the collateral securing the
loan.' In similar fashion, the insurer acquiring an interest in the
reinsurance pool generally obtains an undivided share of-the entire
book of reinsurance which the pool manager has procured for the
benefit of the members of the pool.
Given these meaningful similarities, the resolution of whether a
bank loan participation is a security under federal securities laws
has a direct bearing on reinsurance pools. In Lehigh Valley Trust
Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville,92 the plaintiff bank
bought a participating interest in a loan originated by the defendant
bank. When the loan became uncollectable, the plaintiff sued for
damages on the grounds that the defendant, in selling the loan
participation, had issued a security and failed to make a full disclo-
sure of all material facts, thereby violating rule 10b-5 under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. On appeal, the defendant
88. Note, Bank Loan Participations: The Affirmative Duty to Disclose Under SEC Rule
Iob-5, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 807, 818-19 (1976).
89. Id. at 808.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 807-08.
92. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
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argued that no security was involved. The Fifth Circuit prefaced its
discussion by distinguishing between the loan participation and the
underlying note evidencing the loan. The court found that the loan
participation was "clearly within the statutory definition of a secu-
rity . . . . 3 In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the
Supreme Court's policy of giving a broad construction to the defini-
tion of a security and its generally "expansive construction" of the
anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws.
The holding in Lehigh Valley is now well accepted in the Ameri-
can banking industry.94 It is only a matter of time before the same
principles will probably be applied to reinsurance pools.
CONCURRENT REGULATION
Perhaps the most glaring misconception in the American Mutual
opinion was the court's finding that participations in reinsurance
pools, like insurance policies, need not be subjected to the federal
and state securities laws because other agencies regulate some as-
pects of the pool manager's business. 5 A recent decision by the
Fourth Circuit illustrates the fallacies in this holding.
In Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan,96 the court found that
investment certificates issued by an industrial loan corporation
were not securities within the meaning of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. One of the principal reasons which the court
advanced for its holding was the possibility of an overlap in jurisdic-
tion. It noted that if certificates of deposit were treated as securities,
SEC regulations would be superimposed upon an existing system of
state and federal regulation of the banking industry. Finding no
indication that Congress intended this result, the court noted that
the overlap might cause inter-agency conflict. As further justifica-
93. Id. at 992.
94. See Isaac, Loan Participation and the Securities Laws, 58 J. OF COMMERCIAL BANK
LENDING 50 (1975). The author comments:
Although many people are surprised by this fact, it is pretty well established that
loan participations are securities . . . .In the only reported case directly in point,
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, . . . the 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a loan participation agreement between banks
was a security within the meaning of the Federal securities laws.
Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
95. Since the McCarran Act has no bearing on state Blue Sky laws, the court should have
considered whether a security as defined under state law had been issued. However, the
American Mutual court dismissed the applicability of the Blue Sky laws by referring to
concurrent regulation by other state authorities, saying that this was also a rationale for
finding the federal securities laws to be inapplicable. 52 Il1. App. 3d 922, 927, 367 N.E.2d 104,
109 (lst Dist. 1977).
96. 537 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1976).
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tion, it cited the SEC's lack of expertise in the field of banking. 7
The Securities and Exchange Commission obtained leave of court
to file a memorandum as amicus curiae in support of a petition for
rehearing. In its memorandum, the Commission noted that under
sections 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Act of 1933,11 securities
issued by a banking institution which were subject to state and
federal regulation were exempt from the registration requirements
of the federal securities laws, but not necessarily exempt from the
antifraud provisions.9
Turning to the question of whether or not the possibility of an
overlap of the federal securities laws with state and federal banking
regulations was a proper basis for the court's ruling, the Commission
said the overlap concern "cannot itself justify a restrictive and in-
correct reading of the statutes ... ,,'0 The SEC's principal argu-
ment was that
[wihile the existence of state or federal bank regulations may
result in an exemption for bank securities from the Securities Act's
registration provisions, and may result in the administration by
bank authorities of certain regulatory provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act, it has no bearing on whether an instrument is a
security and therefore subject to the antifraud protections, which
were intended to be available to all investors, even those who in-
vest in bank-type securities.'
Furthermore, the SEC disagreed with the Burrus court's effort to
distinguish Tcherepnin v. Knight, 02 a case in which the Supreme
Court found that withdrawable capital shares were securities. The
Burrus court found the situations distinguishable because the with-
drawable shares had characteristics of equity securities while the
Burrus securities were debt securities.' The SEC argued that this
distinction was irrelevant, and that the overlapping jurisdictional
problem, if it existed at all, was the same in Burrus as in
Tcherepnin, because the issuers in both cases were subject to state
regulation.14
97. Id. at 1265.
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2),(a)(5) (1970).
99. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,703 (Sept. 1976). Section 3(a)(8) of the 1933 Act exempts from registration
insurance policies issued by regulated insurance companies. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1970).
100. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP.(CCH) 80,703 (Sept. 1976).
101. Id.
102. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
103. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262, 1265 (4th Cir. 1976).
104. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,703 (Sept. 1976).
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The SEC's memorandum struck a responsive chord. Rehearing
was granted, and subsequently the court whollywithdrew its earlier
opinion and expressly declared that its earlier ruling that the certifi-
cates were not securities was moot. °5 The foregoing discussion indi-
cates that the possibility of overlapping jurisdiction is not of itself
a sufficient reason to hold that the federal securities laws are in-
applicable to reinsurance pools.
The SEC's emphasis on Tcherepnin was well founded. In
Tcherepnin, the Seventh Circuit failed to consider the Howey test.0 6
The Supreme Court held this was erroneous and analyzed the with-
drawable capital shares using the Howey criteria. Despite extensive
regulation of the business of the savings and loan association under
the Illinois Savings and Loan Act, 07 the Tcherepnin Court held the
withdrawable capital shares were securities: "While Illinois law
gives legal form to the withdrawable capital shares held by the
petitioners, federal law must govern whether shares having such
legal form constitute securities under the Securities Exchange
Act.' 1108
In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,10 the Supreme
Court considered whether the annuities issued by an insurance com-
pany were subject to the federal securities laws. Justice Douglas
specifically observed that "[riespondents are regulated under the
insurance law of the District of Columbia and several other
States,""0 but nonetheless found that the federal securities laws
should apply, saying:
We start with a reluctance to disturb the state regulatory schemes
that are in actual effect, either by displacing them or by superim-
posing federal requirements on transactions that are tailored to
meet state requirements. When the States speak in the field of
"insurance," they speak with the authority of a long tradition. For
the regulation of "insurance" though within the ambit of federal
power ...has traditionally been under the control of the States.
We deal, however, with federal statutes where the words
"insurance" and "annuity" are federal terms .... .[H]ow the
States may have ruled is not decisive. For, as we have said, the
meaning of "insurance" and "annuity" under these Federal Acts
is a federal question."'
105. 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the result it had reached
but on grounds entirely unrelated to the securities laws.
106. 389 U.S. at 339 n.21.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 701-944 (1975).
108. 389 U.S. at 337-38.
109. 359 U.S. 65 (1965).
110. Id. at 67.
111. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
19781
Loyola University Law Journal
Thus, regulation by another state or federal agency does not end
the inquiry. Other state or federal regulation will not, per se, take
any particular contract, certificate or instrumentality outside the
reach of the securities laws. In both Variable Annuity and
Tcherepnin the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the exist-
ence of state regulation but, nevertheless, decided whether a partic-
ular instrumentality was a security under the Howey test.
CONCLUSION
The reinsurance industry is expanding rapidly and reinsurance
pools are an important part of that industry. Whether reinsurance
pool participations come within the federal and state securities laws
is a question which deserves careful consideration. The Illinois Ap-
pellate Court in American Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co. " did not address this issue in a satisfactory manner.
The court's opinion is contrary to the weight of authority concerning
the McCarran-Ferguson Act," 3 and the holding cannot be reconciled
with that of the Supreme Court in SEC v. National Securities. "I At
a minimum, the court should have analyzed the reinsurance con-
tract in light of the Howey criteria.
It is anticipated that other courts confronted with comparable
cases in the future will look beyond the fact that the insurance
industry is involved, and recognize these participatory interests are
securities. Given the questions left unanswered by American
Mutual, it seems safe to predict that more will be heard on this
subject in the future.
112. 52 I1. App. 3d 922, 367 N.E.2d 104 (lst Dist. 1977).
113. See text accompanying notes 19-36 supra.
114. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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